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Abstract 
 
Recently, numerous firms announced that they would voluntarily begin recognizing the SFAS 123 
expense. We use standard event-study methodology and regression analysis to analyze the equity 
valuation effects of these announcements. SFAS 123 requires firms to calculate the fair value of 
stock options granted but allows firms to either recognize the expense in their income statements 
or simply disclose the impact on net income in financial statement footnotes. Our results reveal 
statistically significant positive abnormal announcement period returns for the full sample of firms 
analyzed, with results mainly driven by firms that are early (July or August 2002 announcements) 
announcers. In addition, regressions confirm a significant negative relationship between the size 
of the stock option expense and the abnormal announcement returns. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
tatement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (SFAS 123) requires firms to calculate the fair 
value of stock options granted but allows firms to either recognize the expense in their income 
statements or simply disclose the impact on net income in financial statement footnotes (FASB 1995). 
Until recently only a few firms chose to recognize the expense. However, in the summer of 2002 numerous firms 
announced that they would voluntarily begin recognizing SFAS 123 expense. The voluntary actions of these firms 
lead us to question why firms suddenly chose to begin recognizing the expense and what benefit they expected in 
return. 
 
Theoretically, the impact of these announcements is debatable since the calculated expense is disclosed to 
market participants whether or not it is recognized. Given the availability of the calculated expense, it is possible 
that the announcements of expense recognition do not provide incremental information to investors and may 
represent non-events. If this line of reasoning is correct, the recognition announcements should result in no equity 
valuation effects. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that firms make decisions that are in their best 
interests, suggesting that announcements of recognition of stock option expense will be made when benefits of 
recognition exceed costs.  
 
We focus our investigation on the reaction of market participants to firms’ decisions to recognize stock-
based compensation expense. We use standard event-study methodology and regression analysis to analyze 
abnormal announcement-period returns. Our results reveal statistically significant positive abnormal announcement-
period returns for the full sample of firms announcing recognition of stock option expenses. However, the 
regressions confirm that these results are driven by the positive market reactions to expense recognition 
announcements accruing to those firms that are early (July or August 2002 announcements) announcers. Regressions 
also show a significant negative relationship between the size of the stock option expense and the abnormal 
announcement returns. These results confirm some of the findings by Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (May 2004) and 
by Robinson and Burton (2004). 
S 
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Accounting Treatment of Stock Option Expense  
 
The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) issued SFAS 123 in 1995 after more than a decade of 
deliberations. Although the exposure draft of the SFAS indicated that stock option amounts should be recognized as 
an expense, political pressure led the FASB to modify the proposal. The result was that SFAS 123 encouraged 
companies to adopt a fair vale pricing model to measure and recognize the option value at the grant date and record 
a portion of this amount as annual expense over the vesting period of the option. However, it allowed firms to 
choose not to recognize the expense but instead simply disclose the pro forma impact of the fair value of options on 
their annual earnings and earnings per share in the footnotes of their annual reports. Until recently few firms chose 
to recognize stock option expense, but beginning in the summer of 2002 a large number of firms announced that 
they will do so. 
 
During the same time frame, the FASB continued to consider the stock option expense issue and in 
December 2002 the SFAS 148 was issued to amend the transition provisions and footnote disclosure rules of SFAS 
123 (FASB 2002). The amendments to footnote disclosures extended the SFAS 123 requirements to interim periods. 
Also, on April 2004, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued an International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) on shared-based payments that required the use of fair values to measure and expense all 
such transactions (IASB 2004). Finally, on March 31, 2004, the FASB issued an exposure draft (ED) that will 
eliminate the non-recognition or footnote disclosure approach to accounting for stock option costs (FASB 2004). 
The FASB aims to complete its work on final standards in late 2004 (KPMG 2004), promoting international 
harmonization and convergence in accounting for share-based compensation. 
 
Many argue that while the FASB and the IASB are on the right track in requiring the recognition of stock 
option expenses, their proposals do not address all controversies (Best, Rue, and Volkan 2002; Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee of the AAA 2004; Kirschenheiter, Mathur, and Thomas 2004). These critics recommend that 
both the FASB and the IASB abandon the static option valuation and expensing procedures they support and adopt a 
dynamic model of periodic revaluation of options by marking the value of options to market at the financial 
statement dates (Hull and White 2004). In addition, the critics argue that market based measurement and recognition 
of option costs must continue after the service or vesting period ends and until the options are either exercised or 
expire, ensuring that both the total amount of wealth that has been transferred from stockholders to executives and 
the amount that could be transferred in the future are reported in the financial statements (Briloff 2003; Rue, Volkan, 
Best, and Lobo 2003; Deshmukh, Howe, and Luft 2004). 
 
Potential Benefits of Stock Option Expense Recognition 
 
The continuing debate surrounding the recognition of stock option expense is interesting since conventional 
wisdom holds that as long as calculated stock-option expense is disclosed to market participants, announcements of 
expense recognition should not provide incremental information to investors. Support for this contention is found in 
Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (April 2004) who report a significant negative relationship between share prices/returns 
and unrecognized SFAS 123 expense which indicates that market participants consider the reported but 
unrecognized expense when valuing firms. 
 
However, the sudden rush to voluntary recognition of the expense by numerous firms is indicative of 
perceived benefits [e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1983); Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001)]. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the announcements of voluntary recognition began in earnest in the summer of 2002 and 
coincided with high profile financial reporting scandals concerning firms such as Enron and WorldCom. Also, 
during this time, debate intensified regarding the appropriateness of the expensing of stock-based compensation, 
with many market participants indicating a preference for recognition of the expense. Further, many of the 
proponents of stock-based compensation expense recognition suggested that recognition could increase earnings 
transparency thereby decreasing information asymmetry and increasing the confidence of market participants in the 
financial reports of the firms. For example, Warren Buffet, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., argued that firms that 
voluntarily recognized the expense would develop a reputation for being believable (Business Week, July 29, 2002). 
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These observations imply that announcements of expense recognition draw attention to the firms and serve 
as a signal of quality financial reporting. The announcements may also indicate the firms’ commitments to cost-
effective stock-based compensation plans and generally conservative accounting choices. Possible benefits of such 
signals are shown by Hughes and Levine (2003) who develop a model in which firms that commit to conservative 
accounting choices credibly convey favorable information about future cash flows. Lower quality firms would not 
likely mimic higher quality firms in recognizing these expenses since recognition is costly to the firms due to its is 
irreversible nature and negative impact on net income relative to the disclosure alternative. The latter is particularly 
important since many covenants and contracts have earnings based thresholds that are costly to violate (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994). 
 
While, in 2002, many market participants began to associate stock-option expense recognition with 
increased earnings quality, several popular financial press outlets started to focus on stock based compensation and 
its effects. For example, the link between recognition of stock option expense and possible benefits such as 
perceived earnings quality, acknowledgment of the level of stock options used, and enhanced reputation is discussed 
in an article by Business Week (July 29, 2002, p. 46) entitled “To Expense or Not to Expense.” The main premise of 
the article is that less-hyped earnings figures will boost investor confidence. 
 
Thus, the increased focus on recognition of stock-option expense and the discussion of possible benefits 
may have motivated firms to act. Whether the potential benefits translated into positive firm valuation effects is an 
empirical question. We examine this question in the following sections of the paper by identifying firms that 
announce the recognition of stock-option expense and calculating the resulting equity valuation effects.  
 
Sample 
 
We used the Lexis/Nexis database to search all available newswire services for firms that announced 
recognition of stock option expense during the years 2002 and 2003. The search yielded 135 firms for which we 
could identify announcement dates. We also checked whether additional information was released concurrent with 
the expense recognition announcement, to analyze confounding effects. 
 
Individual firm stock return and stock index return information is gathered from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. Additional firm data is gathered from the COMPUSTAT database, with all 
variables measured as of the end of the fiscal period preceding the expense recognition announcement. Means, 
medians, minimums, and maximums are calculated for selected variables for 135 firms announcing expensing of 
stock options during the period from 2002 to 2003. Total assets, net income, and market value of equity (calculated 
as stock price multiplied times common shares outstanding) are collected to provide measures of size and 
profitability. These variables are important for cross-sectional analysis since various studies of market reactions 
indicate possible size effects. 
 
Since resolution of information asymmetry is one postulated benefit of announcing stock option expense 
recognition, we retrieve information on institutional stock ownership which represents the percentage of a firm’s 
aggregate number of shares outstanding held by institutions. Stock price is the closing stock price at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the announcement. Finally, we collect the stock option expense from the COMPUSTAT 
database. This option expense variable indicates the fair value effect of stock options on earnings per share. 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of firms. The average of total assets is $68,767 million 
with a median value of $8,109 million. Average market value of equity is $21,603 million with a median value of 
$3,177 million. Stock prices range from a low of $1.96 to a high of $666.75 with a mean value of $32.72. Shares 
held by institutions as a percentage of total share outstanding range from zero to 36.70 percent, with a mean value of 
4.13 percent. Finally, the COMPUSTAT calculated fair value effect of stock options on earnings per share average 
$0.12 with a median value of $0.06. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
 
Characteristic     Mean    Median      Minimum   Maximum 
 
Total assets (millions of $$) 68767.27    8109.14         31.72  1051450.00 
MV of equity (millions of $$) 21603.14    3176.61         2.91   397831.60 
Net income (millions of $$)  785.37    60.31         -5453.00  4126.00 
Stock Price ($$)   42.70    32.72         1.96   666.75 
Institutional holdings (%)  4.13    3.87         0.00   36.70 
Option expense/share ($$)  0.12    0.06         0.00   1.02 
 
 
Methodology and Results 
 
Standard event-study methodology as described in Brown and Warner (1985) is used to calculate 
announcement period abnormal returns. For each event we define day 0 as the date of the newswire article 
containing the announcement of the intent to recognize stock option expense and day 1 as the following day. The 
announcement period is defined as day 0 and day 1. The two days are used since it is not always possible to 
determine whether the announcement on day zero occurred prior to the end of trading on that day. Cumulative 
abnormal returns for the announcement period are market model prediction errors for day 0 and day 1. The market 
model parameters are estimated using ordinary-least-squares-regressions over the time period beginning 270 trading 
days before the announcement and ending 15 days before the announcement. The CRSP equal-weighted stock index 
is used as the market proxy. 
 
Table 2 contains the results of the event-study analysis. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean abnormal 
announcement period return for the full sample of firms is positive 0.7433%, which is statistically different from 
zero at the 1% (99% confidence) level. However, a large number of firms released additional information 
concurrently with the announcement of recognition of stock option expense. Also, several members of the Financial 
Services Forum (FSF) announced their decisions to expense stock options simultaneously.
 
 Since concurrent 
information release and simultaneous industry release could affect the announcements, Panel B of Table 2 separates 
the firms into three categories: (1) firms with no concurrent information release; (2) firms with concurrent 
information release; and (3) FSF member firms that simultaneously announce their decisions. While the members 
who announce before that time were not removed from the sample, their removal would not materially affect the 
results. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that FSF members exhibit an average abnormal announcement period return that 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero (0.0128%). The mean abnormal announcement return for firms with 
concurrent information releases is 1.0483% which is statistically different from zero at the 1% (99% confidence) 
level. Firms with no concurrent information releases exhibit a smaller positive mean abnormal return of 0.6311% 
which is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels (confidence levels of 95% or more). Although 
this result suggests that stock-option expense recognition may not yield significant stock price reactions, further 
analysis is required. 
 
An examination of the sample firms indicates that 77 of the firms’ announcement dates occur in July and 
August 2002. Since it is logical that firms who expect the greatest benefit from announcing will do so first, we 
further divide the sample into early and late announcers. For example, popular press discussions of stock-option 
expense recognition announcement by Coke espouse this opinion. In nearly all news releases, Coke is characterized 
as a marginal user of options, with a relatively easy decision to look bold and make the switch to expense 
recognition (Business Week, July 29, 2002). 
 
Our reported results are based on defining early announcers as those firms announcing recognition of stock-
option expense in July and August of 2002. We also estimate results defining early announcers as those firms 
announcing expense recognition within one or two months of the date of the very first recognition announcement, 
which was made in mid-July, 2002. The results are similar regardless of the definition used. We exclude the FSF 
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firms who simultaneously announce from this analysis. Panel C of Table 2 shows that early announcers exhibit 
positive abnormal announcement period returns that are significantly different from zero regardless of whether or 
not concurrent information is released. The mean abnormal return for early announcers with no concurrent 
information release is 1.7835% while the mean abnormal return for those with concurrent information is 1.8558%. 
 
 
Table 2. Abnormal Announcement Period Returns for Firms Announcing Stock Option Expensing 
 
Sample of firms   Sample size   Mean (Median)   z-statistic 
 
Panel A: All firms announcing expensing of stock options. 
 
All firms         135         0.7433      3.64a 
 
Panel B: Firms announcing expensing of stock options categorized by whether concurrent information is released at the 
announcement date, with “trade group” announcements separated. 
 
No concurrent information         54         0.6311      1.52 
Concurrent information present        63         1.0483        3.87a 
Trade group          18         0.0128      0.09 
 
Panel C: Firms announcing expensing of stock options categorized by timing of the announcement and concurrent 
information. 
 
Early announcement and  
no concurrent info          26         1.7835      3.05a 
Late announcement and  
no concurrent info          28        -0.4389     -0.83 
Early announcement with  
concurrent info          33         1.8558      4.44a 
Late announcement with  
concurrent info          30         0.1600      0.95 
(a) Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
 
On the contrary, late announcers exhibit abnormal announcement period returns that are not statistically 
different from zero. The mean abnormal return for late announcers with is -0.4389% while the mean abnormal return 
for late announcers with concurrent information is 0.1600%. Further, difference-in-mean tests show that the 
differences in mean abnormal returns to early and late announcers are statistically significant. 
 
These results appear consistent with the view that market participants consider early announcers’ stock 
option expense recognition decisions to be positive signals. The evidence lends credence to the proposition that the 
announcements indicate the firms’ commitments to cost-effective stock-based compensation plans and generally 
conservative accounting choices. On the other hand, late announcers’ decisions are not accepted as positive signals 
by market participants and contain no significant information. Apparently, market participants believe that these 
firms either base their decisions on the belief that expense recognition will become mandatory in the future or are 
mimicking the early announcers. 
 
To further examine possible determinants of the abnormal announcement period returns, we estimate 
regressions for the 117 sample firms that individually announced their decision to expense stock options (18 firms 
were FSF members), with the two-day abnormal announcement period returns as dependent variables and various 
firm data as explanatory variables. As it was the case for the analysis of the entire sample, individual firm stock 
return and stock index return information is gathered from the CRSP database and additional firm data is gathered 
from the COMPUSTAT database, with all variables measured as of the end of the fiscal period preceding the 
expense recognition announcement. 
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The independent variables include the log of each firm’s market value of equity (MVE), the percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors (IH%), an indicator variable that identifies whether a firm is an early announcer 
(E), the impact of stock option expense on earnings per share (EPSI) calculated by COMPUSTAT using fair values, 
and an indicator variable indicating whether concurrent information is released at the time of the stock option 
expense recognition announcement (CI). All test statistics are computed using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix. 
 
The natural log of the MVE is included as a measure of firm size, with similar results obtained when the 
natural logarithm of total assets is used as the firm size proxy. We control for size since larger firms may have 
greater pre-existing reputation capital with investors that will affect the reaction to new announcements. The IH% is 
included as a measure of information asymmetry. The presumption is that greater institutional holdings result in 
more monitoring and less information asymmetry. The indicator variable E is included that equals one for firms 
designated as early announcers (announcement is made in July or August 2002), and zero otherwise. The EPSI is 
included since it is likely that the market reaction is related to the size of the option expense recognized. Finally, CI 
is included that equals one for firms with additional information released concurrently with the expense recognition 
announcement, and zero otherwise. 
 
Regression results are shown in Table 3. Regression (1) includes all independent variables except the 
concurrent information (CI) indicator variable. The coefficient for institutional holdings (IH%) is 0.04 and it is not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that information asymmetry differences are not driving the returns. 
The coefficient for MVE is 0.34 which is significantly different from zero at the 10% (90% confidence) level, 
indicating that the market reaction to expense recognition announcements is more positive for larger firms. The 
coefficient for early announcers (E) is 1.86 and it is significantly different from zero at the 5% (95% confidence) 
level. This result indicates that early announcers exhibit an announcement period abnormal return that is 1.86% 
larger than that of late announcers, confirming that event study analysis was warranted. The option expense (EPSI) 
coefficient is -3.91 which is significantly different from zero at the 5% (95% confidence) level. This indicates that 
the abnormal announcement period return is reduced for firms with larger stock option expense and that recognition 
in financial statements is superior to footnote disclosure since market participants do perceive a cost associated with 
stock option expense recognition. Regression (2) reveals that the estimated coefficient of the concurrent information 
indicator variable is not significantly different from zero and that its inclusion has little effect on the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the other variables. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We investigate the market reaction to firms’ 
decisions to recognize stock-based compensation 
expense. The SFAS 123 requires firms to calculate 
the fair value of stock options granted but allows 
firms to either recognize the expense in their 
income statements or simply disclose the impact on 
net income in financial statement footnotes. After 
the SFAS 123 was issued, only a few firms chose 
to recognize the expense. However, in the summer 
of 2002 numerous firms announced that they would 
voluntarily begin recognizing SFAS 123 expense. 
This raises the question of whether the decision to 
voluntarily recognize stock option expense affects 
firms’ values. 
 
We examine the issue by calculating the stock price reaction to announcements of recognition of stock-
based compensation expense. We use standard event-study methodology and regression analysis to analyze 
abnormal announcement period returns. Our results indicate that some firms do experience abnormal stock price 
Table 3. Regression Results for 117 Firms Announcing 
Stock Option Expensing (z-statistic in parenthesis) 
 
Variable Regression (1)  Regression (2) 
Intercept  -2.00 (1.15)  -2.45 (1.50) 
MVE  0.34  (1.76c)  0.36  (1.92c) 
IH%  -0.04 (0.49)  -0.04 (0.49) 
E  1.86  (2.05b)  1.83  (2.14b) 
EPSI  -3.91 (2.18b)  -4.01 (2.12b) 
CI     0.62  (0.73) 
Adjusted R2 0.0487   0.0438 
(b) Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
(c) Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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reactions upon announcing recognition of stock option expense. However, the results are driven by the positive 
market reactions to expense recognition announcements that accrue to firms that are early announcers, with late 
announcers accruing no benefit. We also find a significant negative relationship between the size of the stock option 
expense and the abnormal announcement returns, indicating that stock options have material costs and recognition 
approach to accounting for stock options is superior to footnote disclosure. Thus, the time, money, and effort spent 
by the FASB and the IASB to revise the SFAS 123 and to achieve international harmonization have merit.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 Future research could focus on the cross-sectional differences between the characteristics of those firms 
that recognized stock option expense versus firms that opted for footnote disclosure only. In addition, one could 
examine the differences between the size of the option expense and its impact on the financial measures of firms 
announcing expense recognition versus firms that did not. Finally, event studies concerning industry counterparts 
could be conducted to examine the reaction of market participants to those firms in a given industry that recognized 
option expense versus those that did not.  
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